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STRICT LIABILITY AND ECONOMIC HARM IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTION
N Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,' the Ohio Supreme Court formally
adopted section 402 (A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,2 thus
recognizing in Ohio the Restatement's strict liability cause of action for
injury caused by defectively manufactured products.' Although the Re-
statement clearly states that recovery may be had in strict liability for
personal injury and for property damage, there is debate over whether
"economic loss" should be recoverable under the doctrine of strict lia-
bility.' This comment will review existing case law to determine whether
economic loss may be recovered from the manufacturer of a defective
product under a theory of strict liability in Ohio.
Economic loss encompasses two areas of recovery, direct economic
harm and consequential economic harm. Direct economic harm exists where
the manufacturing defect causes damage to the product itself rendering
150 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965), states:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
The court in Temple recognized that the doctrine of strict liability in tort was not new to
Ohio. The doctrine was first used in Ohio in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio
St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966), under the name of "implied warranty in tort." 50
Ohio St. 2d at 320-21, 364 N.E.2d at 270. See also Weber, Strict Liability Comes of Age in
Ohio: Almost, 11 AKRON L. REV. 679 (1978); Jenkins, The Product Liability of Manu-
facturers: An Understanding and Exploration, 4 AKRON L. REV. 135, 152-62 (1971); Note,
Recovery of Direct Economic Loss: The Unanswered Questions of Ohio Products Liability
Law, 27 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 683, 712 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Note, Recovery of
Direct Economic Loss).
4 For discussions favoring the recovery of economic loss in strict liability see Note, Prod-
ucts Liability: Expanding the Property Damage Exception In Pure Economic Loss Cases,
54 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1978); Comment, Products Liability: Recovery of Economic
Loss in California, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 297 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Recovery
of Economic Loss); Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO
L. REV. 29 (1976); Note, Manufacturer's Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic
Loss, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 401 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Note, Manufacturer's Strict
Tort Liability).
For a contrary view see Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the U.C.C.,
40 TENN. L. REv. 309 (1973); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) (hereinafter cited as The Fall of the Citadel); Note,
Economic Loss From Defective Products, 4 WiLLAMETrE L.J. 402 (1967); Comment, Manu-
facturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966).
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the product inferior in quality and preventing it from fulfilling the pur-
pose for which it was purchased.5 Consequential economic harm, as the
name implies, consists of damages which arise as a consequence of the
direct economic harm. Examples of consequential economic harm include
lost profits, expenses incurred in renting a substitute product, and repair
costs.,
It is the opinion of this writer that to allow recovery of direct and
consequential economic harm in every factual situation is to undermine
the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. While direct
economic loss should always be recoverable, since it is in reality prop-
erty damage, recovery of consequential damages should be limited to con-
sumer transactions. Recovery for consequential economic loss in the
commercial setting does not further any of the policies underlying the
doctrine of strict liability and may place an unjustifiable burden on the
shoulders of the manufacturer.
II. THE BASIC CONFLICT: Seeley AND Santor
The decision as to whether damages for economic harm should be
recoverable in a strict products liability action rests on what the court
sees as the philosophy underlying the strict liability doctrine. Dean Prosser
suggested that there are three convincing arguments for the doctrine of
strict products liability: 1) "[t]he public interest in human life, health and
safety;" 2) the representation by the supplier of the safety of the product by
placing it on the market; 3) the manufacturer may be reached by one suit in-
stead of a series of suits.7 An alternative basis for the adoption of strict lia-
bility is suggested in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.8 Under this view
strict liability would grow from the inequality of bargaining power between
the manufacturer and the consumer. Contract law, which is based on the equal
bargaining power of the parties, is inadequate to serve the needs of the
consumer and thus a remedy must be created elsewhere.'
How the court's perception of the philosophy behind strict products
liability affects economic recovery can be seen by examining the two major
decisions in this area, Seely v. White Motors Co.' ° and Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc."
5 Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966).
0 ld.
7 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. REV.
1099, 1122-24 (1960). See also, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 50 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
8 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9 For a discussion of inequality of bargaining power as the underlying basis of strict lia-bility recovery see Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of
Judicial Confusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978).
1063 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
11 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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In Seely plaintiff, a small businessman, brought an action against the
manufacturer of a truck which had overturned, seeking to recover the
money he had paid on the purchase price and lost profits in his business
caused by his inability to use the truck. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking
for the majority of the California Supreme Court, found that plaintiff
could recover his economic losses because the defendant had breached an
express warranty. Continuing on in dictum, however, Chief Justice Tray-
nor stated that recovery for such economic losses could not be based upon
the doctrine of strict liability in tort:
The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic
relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. The history of
the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed,
not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the
Uniform Commercial Code, but, rather, to govern the distinct prob-
lem of physical injuries."
Chief Justice Traynor felt that imposing strict tort liability for these "eco-
nomic" injuries would subject the manufacturer to damage claims of un-
known and unlimited amounts; such liability should not exist unless there
is an agreement between the buyer and manufacturer. Strict tort liability
was not a question of bargaining ability in the Chief Justice's view. It
emerged from the "overwhelming misfortune" caused by personal injury
and the fact that the manufacturer is in the best position to spread the
cost of these injuries among the public. As to economic harm "[lt]hat
rationale in no way justifies requiring the consuming public to pay more
for their products so that a manufacturer can insure against the possibility
that some of his products will not meet the business needs of some of
his customers."13 Interestingly enough, Chief Justice Traynor concluded
that plaintiff would have been able to recover for the damage to his truck
if he had proved that the defect caused the damage since "[p]hysical
injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for
distinguishing them."'"
In contrast to Seely is the view taken in the New Jersey case of Santor
v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.15 In Santor, plaintiff purchased a carpet sold
as Grade 1. Almost immediately after the carpet was laid it developed an
unusual line in it. Plaintiff received assurances that the line would "walk
out," but the problem grew worse, and two new lines appeared. Plaintiff
brought an action seeking recovery for the cost of the carpeting based on
a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability by the manufacturer
defendant. The trial court awarded plaintiff his damages.
12 63 Cal. 2d at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
13 Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
14 Id., 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
15 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the lower court, hold-
ing that there was no action for implied warranty without privity absent
personal injury."0 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, in an
opinion by Justice Francis, saw no reason for limiting the implied war-
ranty to cases of personal injury.
But we see no just cause for recognition of the existence of an implied
warranty of merchantability and a right to recovery for breach there-
of regardless of lack of privity of the claimant in the one case [per-
sonal injury] and the exclusion of recovery in the other simply be-
cause loss of value of the article sold is the only damage resulting
from the breach.'
According to Justice Francis, present contract requirements of privity
did not adequately protect the consumer in "this era of complex mar-
keting practices and assembly line manufacturing conditions.""8 Adequate
protection could only be found in the "realistic view of strict tort liability."1
The great mass of consumers, being unable to determine if articles are
defective, must rely on the manufacturer. The realities of this situation
create an enterprise liability which "should not depend upon the intricacies
of the law of sales.""0 This being the case, plaintiff was entitled to recover
the "economic" loss.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT IN OHIO
Up until 1957 Ohio law held a manufacturer liable for injuries caused
by defective products under two theories, negligence and warranty. Under
the negligence theory of recovery, privity was required unless the article
was inherently dangerous, or imminently dangerous as a result of the
alleged negligence. Privity was also required in a warranty action.2 1 Then
in 1958 the Ohio Supreme Court decided Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent
Co.22
In Toni, plaintiff alleged that, relying on the representations and
claims made by the defendant to her through its advertisements, she had
purchased a Toni Home Permanent set labeled "Very Gentle." Claiming
that she had explicitly followed the directions contained in the set, plain-
tiff alleged that the ingredients in the set caused her hair to fall off "to
within one-half inch of her scalp."2 3 Plaintiff sought recovery under three
theories: negligence, express warranty, and implied warranty. There was
1682 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d 589 (1964).
1744 N.J. at 59, 207 A.2d at 309.
18 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
291d.
20 1d. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
21Jenkins, supra note 3, at 151.
22 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
2 3 1d., 147 N.E.2d at 613.
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no privity between plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer. The question
before the court was whether plaintiff could maintain an action for breach
of express warranty for personal injuries without privity. The court, through
Justice Zimmerman, held that a cause of action existed under express
warranty.
According to the court, the action for breach of warranty had its
origins in tort, not contract. An express warranty was found to be created
here by the manufacturer's advertisements upon which plaintiff had relied.
The realities of modem manufacturing techniques and the reliance that
the consumer places on the advertisements of the manufacturer led to the
conclusion that the manufacturer must be held to "strict accountability"
when a consumer suffers personal injury because the product is defective
and fails to live up to the representations. Since "[o]ccasions may arise
when it is fitting and wholesome to discard legal concepts of the past to
meet new conditions and practices of our changing and progressing civiliza-
tion," privity could be dispensed with. The court left open the question
whether privity would be required for an action in implied warranty.25
Seven years after deciding Toni the court was faced with the question
of whether direct economic harm was recoverable in a products liability
action in Inglis v. American Motors Corp."8
In Inglis, plaintiff purchased a Rambler automobile from an author-
ized dealer. According to the plaintiff he had paid $2,700 for the auto-
mobile, but due to defects in manufacturing, it was only worth $1,200.
Plaintiff did not allege any personal injuries. Recovery was sought under
express and implied warranty and under negligence. In alleging his cause
of action under express warranty, plaintiff claimed that he purchased the
Rambler in reliance upon the defendant manufacturer's representations
made in the mass communications media. According to the plaintiff, the
manufacturer's advertisements stated that the automobile was "trouble-
free, economical in operation and built and manufactured with high quality
of workmanship. ' - Plaintiff alleged that the defendant manufacturer had
breached this express warranty.28 Plaintiff's second cause of action relied
on an implied warranty of quality and fitness, while his third cause of action
24 Id. at 248, 147 N.E.2d at 615.
25 The court hinted that privity might be dispensed with in an action under implied war-
ranty. In Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1952), the court
held that privity was essential to an action in implied warranty. In Toni the court stated,
"suffice it to say that should a case come before this court with facts resembling those in
the Wood case, it would then be time to re-examine and reappraise that decision." 167 Ohio
St. at 249-50, 147 N.E.2d at 616.
26 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
27 Id. at 133, 209 N.E.2d at 584.
28 Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the cargo door was out of line, the trimming
was torn, the doors were out of line, the engine was extremely noisy, and it leaked oil.
Id. at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 584.
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alleged negligence on the part of the manufacturer in failing to inspect the
automobile prior to delivery.
The court granted plaintiff recovery under a breach of express war-
ranty theory, relying on the reasoning found in Toni to reach this con-
clusion."0 The court, however, did not stop there. After a review of the
principles in Toni, the court examined the Santor decision. Expressing
approval of Santor's statement that there should be no difference between
a product which causes personal injury and one that is merely worthless
because of the defect, the court concluded that the plaintiff could recover
for his "pecuniary loss" under a theory of express warranty. The court
prefaced its discussion of Santor, however, by noting that the carpeting
involved "was widely advertised" and that "[p]laintiff Santor was aware
of this advertising."" °
Since plaintiff had alleged express warranties, the court did not reach
the question of whether "pecuniary" loss could be recovered under a theory
of implied warranty without privity. The court did make it clear, how-
ever, that plaintiff could not recover for economic loss against the manu-
facturer under a negligence theory. The court expressed its agreement
with the following comment by Dean Prosser:
The one kind of damage not included is pecuniary loss. In other words,
loss of the benefit of the bargain. If somebody sells an automobile
to a dealer and the dealer sells it to the plaintiff, and it turns out that
it is just no good as an automobile, so that having paid let us say
$3,000 for the car, the plaintiff has received $1,500 worth of car
and is out of pocket on a $1,500 loss, that kind of pecuniary loss
is still, so far as I can see, limited to contracts between the parties
and the usual rule that for negligence there is no liability for mere
pecuniary loss of a bargain, that is apparently carried over into this
new tort, if that's the name for it."'
Thus, the court in Inglis established that "direct" economic loss was
recoverable under a theory of breach of express warranty. Though the
court relied on Santor to reach this decision, it should be noted that the
Inglis court attached significance to the advertising of the carpeting in
Santor and the fact that the plaintiff in Santor was aware of this advertising.
The court in Inglis also treated the injury to the plaintiff as direct economic
loss. 2 Although not reaching the issue of whether such damages are re-
29 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
30 3 Ohio St. 2d at 138, 209 N.E.2d at 587. Compare Chief Justice Traynor's statement in
Seely: "It was only because the defendant in that case [Santor] marketed the rug as Grade
#1 that the court was justified in holding that the rug was defective." 63 Cal. 2d at 17-18,
403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
31 3 Ohio St. 2d at 140, 209 N.E.2d at 588, quoting Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products
Liability in General, 36 CLEV. B.A.J. 149, 174-75 (1965).
52 "Plaintiff does not allege that this negligence caused any damage to his person or to any
property he owns other than that the auto is not worth what he paid for it." 3 Ohio St. at 140,
209 N.E.2d at 588.
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coverable under implied warranty without privity, the court's agreement
with Dean Prosser's statement that the negligence rule would carry over
to this "new tort" would seem to preclude recovery. 3
One year after the court decided Inglis, a cause of action for breach
of implied warranty without privity resulting in personal injury was recog-
nized in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.3" In this case, plaintiff, an iron-
worker, was injured when steel roof joists manufactured by the defendant
collapsed and fell upon him. Plaintiff was not in privity with the defendant
manufacturer since there was no contract of sale between them. Plaintiff
did not claim negligence and did not allege a breach of express warranty.
The court began its opinion by stating that in Ohio, a plaintiff may
pursue three causes of action in a products liability case: 1) a tort action
in negligence; 2) a cause of action under contract law; and 3) a tort
action "based upon the breach of a duty assumed by the manufacturer-
seller of a product."'3 The duty assumed by the manufacturer arises from
"his implicit representation of good and merchantable quality and fitness
for intended use when he sells the product." 6 The court then turned to
the precise question of whether plaintiff could recover under implied war-
ranty or whether he was restricted to a negligence theory because of the
lack of privity.
Relying on Toni, the court held that privity was not required to main-
tain the implied warranty action. The court pointed out that warranty
grew from tort rather than from contract and quoted Justice Zimmerman's
statement in Toni: "Undoubtedly, the recognition of such a right of action
[warranty] rested on the public policy of protecting an innocent buyer
from harm rather than to insure any contractual rights."37 The court also
pointed out that although Toni was a minority decision when it was decided,
the overwhelming weight of authority had accepted its view and extended
it to include implied warranties. The court then went on to say that Inglis
had extended the rule of Toni to allow a tort action for breach of warranty
for property damage where there was no privity.'8 The warranty in tort
action in Ohio did not depend upon the defendant's use of national ad-
vertising since "[s]uch a rule looks not to the defect in the product which
produced the injury, but focuses upon the question of whether the plaintiff
saw an advertisement, which is not relevant to the creation of the risk
of harm to the plaintiff."3
33 Dean Prosser's view on economic recovery in strict products liability can be found in
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 4, at 822-23.
3+ 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
35 Id. at 229-30, 218 N.E.2d at 188.
86Id. at 230, 218 N.E.2d at 188.
37 Id. at 233, 218 N.E.2d at 190.
na ld. at 235, 218 N.E.2d at 191.
89/d. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192.
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Having established that plaintiff could recover for breach of an im-
plied warranty in tort, the court then stated the necessary elements of
this action. For a plaintiff to recover he must prove: 1) that the product
was defective (a defect exists where the product is not fit for the ordinary
purpose for which it was intended to be used); 2) that the product was
defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer; 3) that the defect
was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries; and 4) that
his presence was in a place that could reasonably be anticipated by the
defendant. The manufacturer has available to him the defenses of assump-
tion of the risk and intervening cause. 0
As of 1966 and the Lonzrick decision, recovery for economic injury
did not seem to be a real possibility. Although economic recovery was
allowed in Inglis and the court had relied on Santor, it is clear that Santor
was treated as an express warranty decision and that Inglis was decided on
such a theory. This treatment echoes the position taken by Chief Justice
Traynor in Seeley."
Other indicators that Ohio would follow the Seely position emerged from
the Lonzrick decision. While Inglis clearly stated that the plaintiff was seek-
ing only pecuniary losses, the Lonzrick decision explained Inglis as allowing
recovery for "property" damage, an injury recoverable under the Seely
rationale. 2 Finally, the language used to justify recovery in Lonzrick, that
warranty arose from the public policy of protecting the buyer from harm,
rather than from protecting "contractual" rights, echoes the position taken
by Chief Justice Traynor in Seely."3
That Ohio was leaning toward the Seely position seemed clear to at
least one Ohio court of appeals. In Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,"
plaintiffs filed a suit for consequential damages resulting from a failure and
breakage of the turbine blades of a generator sold to them by the defendant
manufacturer. Pursuant to a written warranty the manufacturer replaced the
blades. Plaintiff sought $185,000 in damages for additional costs to main-
tain its electricity output, loss of demand charges from other ultility com-
panies, and loss of sales to other utility companies. As part of his complaint,
plaintiff included a cause of action under implied warranty in tort.
Echoing the views of Chief Justice Traynor, the court held that
such consequential damages could not be recovered under an implied
warranty in tort:
40 Id., 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
For a comparison between the Lonzrick holding and Restatement (Second) § 402 (A),
see Jenkins, supra note 3, at 160-61.
41 See note 24 supra.
42 See text following note 11 supra.
43See text accompanying note 9 supra.
44 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
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The purpose of the doctrine of implied warranty in tort-to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers, rather than the injured person powerless to
protect himself-would not be served by permitting the plaintiffs herein
to rely upon the theory of implied warranty in tort."5
The court also felt, as did Chief Justice Traynor, that implied warranty
in tort must be limited in its applicability to preserve the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code:
[W]here implied warranty in tort applies, the parties are not free to
determine by contract the quality of goods which the seller is bound
to deliver or the remedies available to the buyer in the event that
the goods do not measure up to the agreed quality. It is clear, then,
that the doctrine of implied warranty in tort must be limited in its
applicability. Otherwise, unlimited application of the doctrine would
emasculate the Uniform Commercial Code provisions dealing with
products liability. 0
The court then gave three reasons for denying recovery to the plaintiff:
1) the plaintiff was in privity and thus free to negotiate with the defendant
over terms; 2) the plaintiff was seeking "purely consequential damages in
contrast to damages for injury to persons or property;" and 3) the product in-
volved was "not an ordinary consumer product." 7 Thus, the possibility of
recovery for "direct" economic harm in the consumer setting was left open.
In lacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 8 plaintiff contracted with a
construction company for installation of a driveway, patio, and sidewalk at his
home. The construction company performed the work with cement furnished
by the defendant manufacturer. Shortly after completion, changes in the
weather produced small round holes known as "popouts" in the driveway.
Plaintiff also noticed considerable surface scaling. These "popouts" were
a result of soft shale aggregates contained within the cement. Plaintiff
contended that concrete for outdoor use should not contain such aggre-
gates. The defendant manufacturer was aware that the concrete would
be used outdoors. Plaintiff brought an action alleging damages of $15,000
for breach of an implied warranty of fitness in tort, since he lacked privity
with the manufacturer. He received a verdict in the trial court, but the
court of appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff's complaint sounded in
contract.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appeals court.
Citing Lonzrick, the court stated that an injured party in a products lia-
bility action has an action in tort for breach of implied warranty. A fair
reading of plaintiff's complaint supported a tort theory of recovery in
45 Id. at 158, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
4Id., 324 N.E.2d at 588.
47 Id. at 158-59, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
442 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
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that it alleged that the defendant manufacturer failed to fulfill its duty to
provide a fit product. The court noted that plaintiff had not suffered per-
sonal injury, but neither had he alleged merely direct economic loss. Plain-
tiff's injury was "property" damage which should not be distinguished
from personal injury, therefore plaintiff had alleged a cognizable cause
of action."9
Taken literally, the lacono decision held nothing unique in the prod-
ucts liability field. According to its express language, the decision merely
states that in Ohio, property damage is recoverable under a theory of
implied warranty in tort, a view also accepted under the theory of strict
liability."0 A difficulty arises in the lacono decision, however, in that what
the court calls "property" damage would classify under traditional definitions
as economic harm. Under the traditional view "property" damage occurs
when the defective product causes "castastrophic" damage. Included within
this definition is damage to the product itself. Where the damage amounts
to deterioration of the product, in a non-violent manner, however, the
damage is usually considered "economic."' 1 Thus, under the traditional
view, plaintiff's injury in Iacono, since not manifested in a "catastrophic"
occurrence, would fall within the definition of "economic" loss.2
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In A.T.S. Laboratories, Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co.," plaintiff purch-
ased an airplane manufactured by the defendant from a third party who
was the plane's original purchaser. The plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant manufacturer for damage to the aircraft 4 caused by manufactur-
ing defects and also to recover the following consequential damages: 1)
the cost of renting another plane while the original was being repaired;
2) the cost of using alternate commercial transportation; 3) the cost of
repair; 4) lost profits." The defendant alleged three assignments of error,
only two of which are relevant here, against the trial court's finding that
49 Id. at 93, 326 N.E.2d at 270.
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (A) (1965), supra note 2; Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel, supra note 4, at 821.
51 Seely v. White Motors Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 4; Note, Recovery of Direct Economic
Loss, supra note 3, at 687; Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers, supra
note 4, at 541; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 685 (1967).
52 A possible explanation of this result can be found in Note, Recovery of Direct Economic
Loss, supra note 3, at 714 n.208.
5 59 Ohio App. 2d 15, 391 N.E.2d 1041 (1978).
54 The court does not explain whether the damage to the aircraft was caused by a crash,
or whether the aircraft simply did not function correctly. The court states, "A.T.S. expe-
rienced difficulty with the plane and therefore filed a suit . . . ." Id. at 15, 391 N.E.2d at
1042. From a reading of the opinion and the court's failure to mention any catastrophic
accident, it is assumed that A.T.S. brought suit simply because the plane failed to function
properly.
55 Id., at 23, 391 N.E.2d at 1046.
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it had breached an implied warranty in tort."0 First, defendant contended
that a manufacturer cannot be held liable on a theory of implied warranty
in tort for damages to the product itself when the product was purchased
in a used condition from a third party. Second, defendant contended that
a manufacturer cannot be liable for consequential damages caused by
damage to the product itself when the product was purchased in a used
condition from a third party.
The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under
a theory of implied warranty in tort. After discussing the development
of products liability law in Ohio from Toni to Iacono the court quoted
at length from the Santor decision, noting that Santor had "a definitive im-
pact on the emerging product liability law in Ohio.""T The court then
quoted the language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kassab v. Cen-
tral Soya5 :
The language of the Restatement, speaking as it does of injury to
either the individual or his property, appears broad enough to cover
practically all of the harm that could befall one due to a defective prod-
uct. Thus, for example, were one to buy a defective gas range which
exploded, ruining the buyer's kitchen, injuring him, and of course
necessitating a replacement of the stove itself, all of these three ele-
ments of the injury should be compensable. The last, replacing the
stove, has been sometimes referred to as "economic loss" . . . There
would seem to be no reason for excluding this measure of damages
under the Restatement, since the defective product itself is as much
"property" as any other possession of the plaintiff that is damaged
as a result of the manufacturing flaw.59
The court held that under Ohio law the term "property" includes the
product itself.
The court also determined that "consequential" damages were re-
coverable under the theory of implied warranty in tort. Such damages, how-
ever, must be proximately caused by the manufacturer's breach:
The use of the term "consequential" in defining damages is the use
of a term most usually coincident with contract actions. As used in
connection with actions founded in tort . . . the term is more co-
incident with the result of proximate cause. Consequential damages
as used here, means direct damage suffered as a direct and proximate
56 The defendant alleged that there had been a substantial change in the aircraft. The court
found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to lead to the conclusion that the
defect existed while the plane was in defendant's possession. Id. at 21-22, 391 N.E.2d at
1045-46.
57 Id. at 17, 391 N.E.2d at 1043.
58 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
59 59 Ohio App. 2d at 20-21, 391 N.E.2d at 1045.
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result of defendant's breach of the duties imposed by the warranty
implied."0
Under this decision by the court of appeals, therefore, both "direct" and
"consequential" economic injury is recoverable in Ohio. Direct economic
harm is recoverable since it is "property" damage and consequential dam-
ages are recoverable if they are a proximate result of a breach.
Recovery for both direct and consequential economic injury was also
held to be permitted under Ohio law by a federal district court in Mead
Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co."' In 1965 Mead purchased a
steam turbine from a distributor. Under the contract between Mead and
the distributor, liability was limited to repair and replacement of defective
parts for one year. This was the exclusive remedy and consequential damages
were expressly excluded. Within a one-year period the turbine broke down.
Pursuant to the warranty, the distributor made the repairs and Mead did
not seek any consequential damages.
In March of 1974, long after the contractual warranty had run its
course, the turbine again broke down. Mead brought action against the
manufacturer of the steam turbine, and against the manufacturer of the
generator used in the steam turbine for breach of an implied warranty in
tort, claiming $250,000 in direct damages and $1,510,000 in consequential
damages.
The substantive issue before the court was whether these damages were
recoverable under a strict liability theory in Ohio. The court held that
they were. It first developed the distinction between the opinions expressed
in Seely and Santor, and then proceeded to examine the development of
the implied warranty in tort theory in Ohio. The court noted that the In-
glis" decision, while based on express warranty, clearly relied on Santor,
and also made it clear that the express warranty theory used sounded in
tort, not contract. In addition, the court stated that any doubt as to whether
direct economic injury was recoverable under strict liability theory in Ohio
was resolved by the lacono decision: "
While the Ohio Supreme Court labeled the recovery in lacono to be
for "property damage," the plaintiff was really compensated for his
direct economic loss. Just like the plaintiff in Inglis, the plaintiff in
lacono sought to recover the difference between the value of what he
had paid for and the value of what he received. This is clearly a re-
covery of direct economic loss. Therefore, after lacono, it is clear
that Ohio law allows recovery of economic loss under a strict liability
theory."
60 Id. at 23, 391 N.E.2d at 1046.
81465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
e2 See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
63 See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
64 465 F. Supp. at 366.
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In addressing the question of consequential damages the court believed
Avenell rested upon a "tenuous and unarticulated, distinguishment of an
earlier Ohio case law," and since it pre-dated lacono, declined to follow
it.65 The court saw no logic in limiting recovery to direct economic loss
when there has also been indirect economic loss.
V. THE IMPACT OF A.T.S. Laboratories AND Mead
In 1962 Ohio adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)."6
Under U.C.C. section 2-3147 a warranty of merchantability is implied in
a contract for sale of goods if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind. To be merchantable the goods must be "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used. . . ." This warranty of merchant-
ability may be excluded or modified under U.C.C. section 2-3169 pro-
vided that the modifying language mentions merchantability, and, if in
writing, is conspicuous. Exclusion or modification of the warranty is in-
operative to the extent that it is unreasonable."'
The persons protected by the U.C.C. warranty provisions are set out
in U.C.C. section 2-318. Three alternatives are offered, of which Ohio
has adopted Alternative A."' Under this formulation seller's warranties
extend to:
[a]ny natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty ... "I
Under U.C.C. section 2-607'7 "the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller
of the breach or be barred from any remedy . . . ,,71 A reasonable time
for a consumer, however, is to be judged on a different standard than that
used in the commercial setting."
Under U.C.C. section 2-7146 the measure of damages for breach
of warranty is the difference between the value of the goods as accepted
65 ld. n.17.
66 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. chs. 1301-1309 (Page 1979).
67Id. § 1302.27.
68 Id. § 1302.27(B)(3).
e9 Id. § 1302.29(B).
TO Id. § 1302.29(A).
71 Id. § 1302.31.
72 Id.
73 Id. § 1302.65.
74Id. § 1302.65(C)(1).
75 U.C.C. § 2-607, Comment 4.
76 OHao REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.88(B) (Page 1979).
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and their value as warranted. Under U.C.C. section 2-715" recovery is
permitted for the buyer's incidental"8 and consequential"9 damages.
Thus, the U.C.C. allows recovery for both direct and consequential dam-
ages for a breach of an implied warranty. Privity is a requirement for
such recovery, although this requirement has been loosened under the
Code."0 The seller is permitted to limit or to exclude this warranty to the
extent that such limitation or exclusion is reasonable. The seller's liability
is also contingent upon his receiving notice of the breach within a "rea-
sonable time." For the buyer to recover under the Code, therefore, he
must comply with the procedure established in the Code, and overcome
the defenses available to the seller.81
Under Restatement (Second) section 402 (A) a manufacturer's lia-
bility arises from selling "any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer ...."82 Some courts have not stressed
the "unreasonably dangerous" language and this is not considered a separate
element for proof by the plaintiff.8 " Ohio follows this view in its judicial
construction of section 402(A). The plaintiff must, however, show that
the product was defective while it was in the seller's hands. According
to the Ohio Supreme Court a product is defective when it is not "of good
and merchantable quality, fit and safe for... [its] ordinary intended use.""
Thus, in Ohio, a defective product is one which fails to live up to the implied
warranty of merchantability."
In Seely, Chief Justice Traynor denied recovery for economic harm by
expressing concern that if such recovery were allowed the doctrine of
strict liability would undermine the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.8 It
is clear that under the decisions rendered in A.T.S. Laboratories"7 and
77 Id. § 1302.89.
78 "Incidental damages include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation, and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reason-
able charges, expenses, or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach." U.C.C. § 2-715(1).
79 Consequential damages . .. include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2).80 See text accompanying notes 71 and 72 supra.
81 The term defenses is used loosely here to refer to the seller's ability to limit his liability
through disclaimers.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
83 See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). See also Note, 7 AKRON L. REV. 361 (1974).
84 Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d at 321, 364 N.E.2d at 270.
85 U.C.C. § 2-314, codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1979).
81 63 Cal. 2d at 15, 403 P.2d at 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
8I See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
[Vol. 13:3
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss3/8
Winter, 1980]
Mead,8" Chief Justice Traynor's fears have become reality in Ohio. In both
situations plaintiffs were able to obtain full recovery from the manufacturer,
who was completely stripped of his ability to limit his liability since under
the Restatement the ability to disclaim liability and the notice requirements
cease to exist. 9 The defendant is left with the defenses of misuse and
assumption of the risk.
The anomalous results such a ruling permits can be seen by the result
reached in Mead. The plaintiff and distributor had contracted for the sale
of the turbine. The contract included disclaimers limiting the distributor's
liability to replacement of defective parts and excluding consequential dam-
ges. Since plaintiff and the distributor were in privity, the U.C.C. was
applicable and the distributor was able to insulate himself from liability.
The manufacturers, however, found themselves in a completely different
position. They were potentially liable to the plaintiff for $1,760,000 simply
because they were not in privity with the plaintiff and therefore unable to
avail themselves of the U.C.C. disclaimer provision."
It is hard to imagine a clearer case of the manufacturer being sub-
jected to "limitless liability." It is also hard to imagine a justification for
such a result. Mead knew who would be manufacturing the steam turbine
and there is no hint in the facts of the case that Mead was in a disadvantag-
eous bargaining position.9" To say that this result is compelled by public
policy is most inappropriate, as the U.C.C. would allow for a completely
different result if privity existed.
It should be noted that the decision places the manufacturer in a very
difficult position. To be able to effectively limit his liability, the manu-
facturer must seek to establish privity with every user or consumer of
his product, since it is clear that if privity exists any claim for direct and
consequential economic harm will be governed by the U.C.C. warranty
provisions. The buyer, however, can avoid the notice requirement of the
U.C.C. and effectively eliminate the manufacturer's use of disclaimers if
he can manage to avoid establishing privity with the manufacturer, a
simple matter of buying through an intermediary. This being the case, a
manufacturer's best course of action, though undoubtedly impractical, is
to deal not through retailers, but directly with the purchaser. This same
situation follows from the decision reached in A.T.S. Laboratories.
These decisions thus allow a plaintiff to reap the benefits of the U.C.C.
warranty provisions without having to bear any of the burdens. The plain-
tiff must suffer the defenses afforded by the Code only if he is unfortunate
88 See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402(A), Comment m (1965).
90U.C.C. § 2-316, codified as Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1979).
91 'The negotiations between Mead and ASEA the distributor were long and involved."
465 F. Supp. at 357.
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enough to be in privity with the defendant. We therefore have one party, the
manufacturer, striving for privity and the other party, the buyer, seeking
to avoid it.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
When determining whether to allow recovery for direct or conse-
quential economic harm under a theory of strict liability it should be recog-
nized at the outset that the underlying policies of strict liability are not
necessarily mutually exclusive propositions. Strict liability is justified not
simply because of the "overwhelming misfortune" caused by personal in-
jury. It is equally justified by a lack of bargaining power. There is no
need to place one policy above the other, since both are serious enough
to require the attention of the law. Both are situations which require redress,
so recovery for economic harm should be allowed where these underlying
policies will be served.
The present Ohio case law, taken as a whole, presents a rational
solution to the economic recovery problem. To implement this solution
a distinction must not only be made between direct and consequential eco-
nomic recovery, but also between consumer and commercial transactions.
As pointed out in A.T.S. Laboratories,92 direct economic harm should
always be recoverable under strict liability. This is because of the simple
fact that direct economic harm is nothing less than property damage. The
product is just as much the property of the buyer as is any other chattel
which he possesses. The conflict revolving around recovery in this area
is simply a matter of how the "property" was injured. Seely established
that recovery could be had for the product if the defect manifested itself
in a catastrophic manner. Santor, however, did not require such catastroph-
ic injury to the "property." In both cases, however, the claim is that the
product, a form of property, was defective. Whether the defect becomes
apparent through a catastrophic incident or remains latent in the product
should not make a difference in liability.3 Recovery should not turn simply
on a dubious classification; a manufacturer who places a useless product
in the hands of the buyer should be required to make good for the product.
This proposition should apply with equal force in both the consumer and
the commercial setting.9'
92See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
93 Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REv. 493,
498-99 (1978).
94 As one commentator has stated:
What practical difference exists between the following two situations? In the first,
a person purchases a set of new tires for his company car from a retail tire store.
The tires prove to have been poorly manufactured and must be replaced after 500
miles. In the second situation, a person purchases a set of new tires for his family
car at the same store. He similarly finds the tires defective and must replace them
after 500 miles of normal use. . . . Obviously they should be treated alike.
Comment, Recovery of Economic Loss, supra note 4, at 315-16.
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As suggested by the A venell 5 decision, the consumer/commercial dis-
tinction becomes important in the area of consequential damages. In the
commercial setting the justification of inequality of bargaining power is
usually not present. The commercial plaintiff is experienced in the work-
ings of the market place. In his quest for a product, he is usually able to
assess his exact needs and negotiate directly with the manufacturer for
what he requires. By being involved in a commercial enterprise, the com-
mercial plaintiff is also in a position to spread the risks that he will be
injured economically. On the other hand, recovery for consequential eco-
nomic harm in the commercial setting subjects the manufacturer to un-
limited liability. The plaintiff in Mead, for example, sought $1,510,000 in
consequential damages.
Consequential economic harm in the consumer area, however, should
be recoverable. Unlike the plaintiff in a commercial setting, the consumer
plaintiff is not in any position to deal directly with the manufacturer on
equal terms. He also lacks the ability to effectively spread the risk of loss.
In contrast to the commercial plaintiff, the consequential losses suffered
by the consumer are more apt to be of a modest amount. The manufacturer
is, therefore, not subjected to unlimited liability.9"
The difficulty inherent in limiting recovery of consequential loss to
the consumer is, of course, establishing the definition of a "consumer." The
question arises in the context of the small businessman who may be in a
position to distribute his losses, yet lacks equal bargaining power. A simple
definition of consumer, restricting the category to one who buys a product
for personal use as opposed to one who buys a product for a profit making
purpose, would foreclose recovery to the small businessman. To prevent
this result further inquiry is necessary. The bargaining power of the par-
ties should be the central focus in reaching a definition of consumer. With
this in mind, the small businessman who is not in a position to bargain on
an equal footing with the manufacturer would fall into the category of a
consumer. Justice Peters in his dissent in Seely suggested that the definition
of a consumer should be developed on a case by case basis, with the
emphasis on the bargaining ability of the plaintiff. 7 This is a logical ap-
proach to the problem, since the question of whether the plaintiff is in a
poor bargaining position will depend on the particular facts of the case.
95 See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
096 It has been contended that consequential losses to the consumer should not be recov-
erable since they are not of "sufficient social importance to concern the law of tort."
Tobin, Products Liability: Recovery of Economic Loss?, 4 N.Z.U. L. REv. 36, 43 (1970).
California allows recovery for economic loss in the consumer setting by statute. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1792 (West 1973).
97 63 Cal. 2d at 28, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Peters, J., dissenting). See also
Note, Manufacturer's Strict Tort Liability, supra note 4, at 414.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court has maintained a steady and progressive
pace in the area of products liability. A reading of the court's decisions in
this area shows that the court is concerned with the policies set forth in
both Seely and Santor justifying strict liability for defective products. The
court's existing decisions relied upon by the appellate courts and the fed-
eral district court to allow recovery for direct economic harm seem cor-
rectly decided, since direct economic harm is really nothing less than prop-
erty damages. However, the extension of this holding to the area of conse-
quential damages in the commercial setting by the lower courts should
be restrained. Although recovery of these damages in the consumer area
gives substance to one of the policies behind strict liability, recovery in the
commercial area undermines the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
EDWARD J. HOWLETT II
RELEASE FROM CONFINEMENT OF PERSONS ACQUITTED
BY REASON OF INSANITY IN OHIO*
I. INTRODUCTION
A N OHIO JURY verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity presumes that
such insanity continues.' Upon an affirmative finding, the trial judge
shall commit the defendant to Lima state hospital.2 According to statute, the
defendant must remain hospitalized until "restored to reason."3
This phrase was interpreted by the Ohio Court of Appeals, Allen
County, in Wolonsky v. Balson.4 The defendant was actively psychotic at
the time of his commitment. By reason of the administration of psycho-
tropic drugs he attained a state of complete remission from the symptoms
of his psychosis and sought release from his commitment in a habeas corpus
action. Among the questions at issue concerning insanity defense law' were
*While this Comment was at the press, the Ohio General Assembly passed Senate Bill 297
(sponsored by Senator Morris Jackson) which became effective April 30, 1980. Among
other things, this law strengthens the control of the trial judge over a person who has
been acquitted by reason of insanity. It also relieves the probate court of commitment and
release authority in these situations. See S.B., 297, 113th Ohio Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1980).
'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1975).
2 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.38 (Page 1975).
3 id.
' 387 N.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. Ohio 1976).
5 Throughout the note, "insanity" will denote the degree of mental illness that exculpates
a defendant in a criminal trial. "Insanity defense" will denote the invocation of mental illness
as a defense to criminal liability. "Release" will denote release from a mental hospital or
institution. "Acquitted patient" will denote any person who has successfully invoked the
insanity defense and then has been hospitalized.
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